Using a large sample of loans initiated by firms targeted by hedge fund activists during 1994-2008, we show that hedge fund activism has significant impacts on firms' bank loan contracts.
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Introduction
In recent years hedge funds have started engaging in shareholder activism and monitoring.
An emerging literature on hedge fund activism (e.g., Kahan and Rock 2006; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008; Greenwood and Schor 2009; and Klein and Zur 2009) issued by Moody's in 2007 also reports that hedge fund activism has a negative impact on the creditworthiness of rated companies (Byrd, Hambly, and Watson 2007) . Despite these concerns among the professional communities, there is little systematic evidence on how creditors are affected and how they react to hedge fund activism.
In this study we examine the impact of hedge fund activism on the bank loan contracting.
Specifically, we investigate whether banks respond to hedge fund activism by adjusting the loan spreads and altering the loan contract terms. We focus on bank loan contracts for several reasons.
2 First, bank loans are alleged to be the largest source of financing for corporations (e.g., Nini, Smith, and Sufi 2009). Net debt issuances have been several hundred times of equity issuances in the past decade, and bank loans represent more than half of this volume (Graham, Li, and Qiu 2008) . It is also reported that about 80% of all public firms obtain capital from private loans, compared with only 15% to 20% that access public debt markets (e.g., Faulkender and Petersen 2006; Sufi 2007) . The terms of loan contracts are likely to have significant impacts on firms'
overall cost of capital. Second, bank loans are based on direct negotiations between firms and their lenders, and priced by informed and sophisticated loan officers. Therefore, the loan market is more informationally efficient than the bond market (Altman, Gande, and Saunders 2004).
Third, bank loan contracts contain a variety of terms such as the loan spread, covenants, collateral requirements, and maturity. Examinations of the impact of hedge fund activism on the loan terms will provide a comprehensive picture on the lenders' responses to this new form of shareholder activism. Finally, it is documented that hedge fund activists frequently demand changes in firms' capital structure and business strategies (Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009 ).
Meanwhile, the debt literature shows that creditors can use contractual covenants to control or restrict corporate financial and investment policies (Smith and Warner 1979; Bradley and Roberts 2005; Nini et al. 2009 ). By analyzing these covenants, we will be able to shed light on whether creditors use debt covenants to counteract the hedge funds' intervention of corporate policies.
How does hedge fund activism affect loan contracting? We argue that there are two main channels. First, the informed monitoring provided by hedge fund activists could benefit 3 debtholders by improving firm value and profitability of target firms (the "monitoring effect").
2 Brav et al. (2008) find that target firms experience increases in operating performance and higher CEO turnover after activism. Klein and Zur (2009) However, hedge fund activism may also hurt debtholders by shifting the balance of power between debtholders and shareholders and exacerbating shareholder-debtholder conflicts (the "expropriation effect"). Hedge fund activists often force the firm management to increase leverage and dividend payouts and repurchase shares (Brav et. al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009). 3 Previous studies show that debtholders respond negatively to leverage-increasing corporate events such as leveraged buyouts (Warga and Welch 1993) . Agency theories also suggest that excessive dividend payments and share repurchases can increase the credit risk by reducing the assets available for meeting debt obligations and increasing the default risk for lenders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Dhillion and Johnson (1994) provide support for the wealth redistribution between stockholders and bondholders in the context of dividend increases.
2 It is argued that hedge funds are more effective monitors than traditional institutions (Kahan and Rock, 2006; Brav et. al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009) . Hedge fund activism often pursue significant strategic changes in individual companies, while traditional institutions are often bound by regulations and a diversification trading strategy that makes strategic activism difficult. In addition, hedge fund managers are more highly motivated to achieve their goals because of the compensation structure.
3 Anecdotal evidence indicates that hedge fund activists request the target company to finance share repurchase by incurring new debts. For example, in an amended Schedule 13D filing against Reddy Ice Holdings Inc. (dated July 17, 2007) , hedge fund activist, Shamrock Activist Value Fund, asserts that "We propose that the Company commence a self-tender for approximately 15% of its outstanding shares at $33 per share, a reasonable premium to the GSO offer. A leveraged recapitalization such as this could be accomplished by incurring $110 million of new debt. We think this level of debt (5.3 × debt to EBITDA) would continue to provide the Company with the financial flexibility necessary to continue to execute its business plan and pursue attractive acquisition opportunities. We believe the necessary financing could be quickly obtained on favourable terms given the Company's strong balance sheet and cash flow."
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Maxwell and Stephens (2003) document that bond ratings are more likely to be downgraded than upgraded after the announcement of the repurchase program, indicating that share repurchases reduce debt value.
In summary, hedge fund activism influences loan contracting through its effect on credit risk. The net impact of hedge fund activism on loan contracting, however, is an empirical question. If hedge fund targeting reduces credit risk through active shareholder monitoring, lenders should be willing to extend credit at more favorable terms by lowering the loan spreads, relaxing the loan covenants, and extending the maturities. Conversely, if hedge fund targeting increases credit risk by exacerbating shareholder-debtholder conflicts, lenders will demand higher loan spreads and more stringent loan terms, and management consents to such terms in order to reduce agency costs of debt.
We begin the empirical investigation by confirming the previous findings that hedge fund activism is associated with increased leverage and total payouts, as well as improvement in operating profitability (e.g., Brav et al. 2008) . Since the former results are potential reasons for exacerbated shareholder-debtholder conflicts and the latter likely results from effective monitoring, they provide some empirical grounds for both the expropriation effect and the monitoring effect.
To analyze the impact of hedge fund activism on bank loan contracting, we compare pricing and non-pricing terms of loans initiated by target firms with the loan terms of firms not targeted by hedge fund activists. We find that, in the year of or following targeting and relative to non-target firms, hedge fund activism targets are charged significantly higher spreads on their loans. Besides, their loans have significantly shorter maturities, more frequently require 5 collaterals, and include more restrictive debt covenants. These results suggest that, on average, hedge fund activism increases credit risk and banks respond with active measures to mitigate the impact.
However, the panel regression results have an alternative explanation. That is, hedge fund activists could choose target firms with high credit risk. To address this concern, we employ two alternative research designs. First, we focus on a subsample of hedge fund target firms that have initiated loans both before and after the targeting year, and compare the pre-event and post-event loan terms. Second, using a matched sample differences-in-differences approach, we compare the change in loan spread for target firms with that for non-target firms over the same period matched on industry and average pre-event loan spread. Our baseline results are robust to both alternative specifications.
We further explore the cross-sectional variation in the effect of activism on cost of debt by comparing events with different announced objectives and tactics. We find that the increase in the cost of debt after the activism is greater when the activism targets the firm's capital structure (e.g., demanding payout increases or share repurchases). There is also evidence that activism targeting the firm's corporate governance (board independence, management change, managerial compensation, etc.) has a negative impact on cost of debt. These results provide additional support for the two possible channels ("expropriation" and "monitoring") through which hedge fund activism affects cost of debt.
Finally, we conduct a number of robustness tests, including controlling for the endogeneity of becoming an activism target, and estimating change-specification regressions for loan terms. Our results continue to hold. We also examine the effect of hedge fund activism on 6 credit rating changes, since previous studies have also used debt ratings to proxy for cost of debt (e.g., Minton and Schrand, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2002) . Consistent with the "expropriation effect", we find that hedge fund activism targets are more likely to have their credit ratings downgraded than non-target firms.
We contribute to the hedge fund activism literature by examining creditors' response to the hedge fund activism. There is little research on the impacts of hedge fund activism on debtholders. Two exceptions are Klein and Zur (2009) We have argued that hedge fund activism could affect bondholder interest through two channels: a positive "monitoring effect" through improvement in firm performance and overall value, and a negative "expropriation effect" through increases in leverage and payout. Therefore, as a starting point, we try to replicate findings in previous research (e.g., Brav et al. 2008 ) on changes in leverage, payout and performance around hedge fund activism with our hedge fund sample. Since increases in financial leverage and payouts are associated with deteriorating creditworthiness (Warga and Welch, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , evidence of these changes will support the premise of the expropriation effect. Separately, an increase in profitability will provide some basis for the monitoring effect.
To examine the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms, we track the characteristics of the target firm in each activism event from five years before the event year to five years after the event year. For each target firm, we identify a control group of firms matched on industry, size and book-to-market. 6 We then report the average firm characteristics of the target firms, their control firms, and the differences in the firm characteristics between the target firms and their control firms. Figure 1 presents the results on changes in target firms' financial leverage, dividend payout, and operating profitability around hedge fund activism events. Panel A examines financial leverage, as measured by the debt-to-capital ratio (LEV) and the long-term debt-tocapital ratio (LTDebtratio). LEV is computed as book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and book value of equity, and LTDebtratio is computed as long-term debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and book value of equity. The control firms have leverage ratios that are relatively stable over the eleven years. In contrast to its control group, the average target firm experiences increases in leverage. From the year -1 to year +5, its debt-to-capital ratio increases by 10.8 percentage points, and its long-term debt-to-capital ratio increases by 7.5 percentage points. Panel B reports the changes in dividend payout, as measured by the dividend yield (DIVYLD, the ratio of common dividend to the market value of common stocks) and the total payout yield (TPAYYLD, the ratio of the sum of dividend and share repurchase to the market value of common stocks). From year -1 to year +5, the dividend yield increases by 0.5 percentage points and the total payout yield increases by 1.5 percentage points for the average target firm. The control firms increase their payouts as well, but to a lesser extent.
Finally, Panel C examines the changes in profitability as measured by ROA. For the target firms, ROA decreases before the event year, and then increases after the event year. The control firms have less variable ROA over years and its average is much lower than that of the target firms. As such, the control group-adjusted ROA of the target firms increases from 3.2 percentage points in the year -1 to 13 percentage points in year +5.
In sum, we are able to replicate previous findings that hedge fund activism is associated with increases in leverage and dividend payout, as well as improvement in profitability.
Therefore, both the expropriation effect and the monitoring effect are plausible channels for hedge fund activism to influence bondholder value.
Summary statistics
We now turn to our major research question --the impact of hedge fund activism on the terms of private loans. We match the hedge fund activism sample with Dealscan data to identify 11 loans initiated by both target firms and non-target firms during 1994 and 2008. The sample used in this analysis contains 9,464 loan observations after we impose data requirements on basic loan terms (loan spread, amount and covenants) and control variables in the multivariate regressions. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the loan contracting terms and control variables, separately for firms that are not targeted by hedge fund activists and those that are targeted in the past two years. As such, the table contrasts loans initiated by the target firms in the 2 years after hedge fund activism with loans initiated by all other firm-years.
There are many significant differences between loan terms in the immediate postactivism firm-years and those in other firm-years. First, the terms of the loans are much more stringent for the post-activism subsample. The loan spread is 81 basis points higher on average and 75 basis points higher in the median. The loan size is much smaller: about 122 million US dollars less. The average loan is more likely to be secured: the probability is 22.3% higher. The loans include greater numbers of covenants, including both financial covenants and general covenants. The probability of the new loan contracts listing specific covenants such as the asset sales sweep covenant, the debt issuance sweep covenant, the dividend restriction covenant, or the capital expenditure restriction covenant, is significantly higher, too. There are fewer lenders involved in the loans. All these results are consistent with more stringent loan terms. One result at odd is that the maturity of the loans becomes longer, which is more consistent with a high credit flexibility.
Second, firm characteristics are quite different between the two subsamples. Target firms in the 2 years following hedge fund activism announcements tend to be smaller, less profitable, and have lower growth, higher leverage, fewer tangible assets, lower Z scores, and lower asset maturity. In the 2 years following hedge fund targeting, the term spread is also lower, by about 11.1 percentage points. These results are largely consistent with those in Brav et al. (2008) .
Empirical analysis
Impact of hedge fund activism on loan terms, baseline regressions
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of hedge fund activism on loan contracting terms, including the pricing term (loan spread) and non-pricing terms (loan maturity, securitization, covenant restrictions, and loan structure). The loan spread is a direct measure of the cost of debt, and a high spread is a response to a high credit risk. Following Graham et al. (2008), we use the natural logarithm of the loan spread as the dependent variable in the regression model. A high loan maturity gives a firm high financial flexibility and is a response to low credit risk. The loan maturity is also in natural logarithm. A secured loan is safer than an unsecured loan and is a response to high credit risk. We also consider four specific loan covenants that restrict asset sales, debt issuance, dividend payment, and capital expenditure. We are particularly interested in restrictions on these four events because they are frequently listed on the activism agenda of hedge funds (Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) . All these covenants reflect the efforts of the bank to limit the credit risk of the loan and can be useful tools for creditors to counteract hedge funds' intervention of firms' business strategies and financial policies. In addition, we count the number of covenants, the number of financial covenants, and the number of general covenants to obtain an overall picture of the restrictiveness of the loan contracts. Financial covenants are limits placed on the level of different accounting variables (ratios) that must be maintained while the loan is outstanding (e.g., Bradley and Roberts 2004).
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General covenants are non-financial covenants that mandate prepayments of debts conditional on an event (such as asset sale or debt issuance), or restrict dividend payments or capital investment.
We also examine the number of lenders involved in the loan, because lenders choose more concentrated loan syndicates to effectively monitor firms with high default risk (Lee and
Mullineaux 2004).
Different models are used in the regressions depending on whether the loan term is a continuous, dichotomous, or count variable. For robustness, both the OLS regression and the median regression specifications are used for log loan spread and log loan maturity. When the dependent variable is a dummy variable, the probit model is used; when it is the number of covenants or lenders, the Poisson model is used.
Our key independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if, in a given year, a firm is targeted by activist hedge funds, and 0 otherwise (Target dummy t ). A significant coefficient on this variable means that, in the year of targeting announcement, the loan contract term examined is significantly different from other years for the same firm as well as different from all other firms. To capture any lagged responses, we also include a one-year lagged target dummy. We include industry, year, loan type, and loan purpose fixed effects to control for industry-specific factors, time trends, and loan-specific factors. We also control for a variety of firm and loan characteristics that are related to firms' credit risk, following Graham et al. (2008) .
These control variables are useful to isolate the effect of hedge fund activism from the differences in the credit risk caused by preexisting firm characteristics. They can also absorb any indirect effect of hedge fund activism through changes in firm characteristics. targeting, target firms experience increases in the credit risk. In response to the increase in the credit risk, lenders charge a higher loan spread on the new loans, reduce the loan maturity, more frequently require collaterals to secure the loans, and demand more restrictive loan covenants.
Besides, fewer lenders are willing to grant new loans to these firms and loan structure becomes more concentrated to reduce free riding in information sharing and monitoring.
Time series variations in loan contract terms
The baseline level regression results can have an alternative explanation. That is, they primarily reflect cross-sectional differences in the credit risk between target firms and non-target firms that exist even before the activism event. To rule out this alternative explanation, we compare the loan contracting terms for target firms before and after the activism event. We consider a subsample consisting of target firms and the eleven years around the targeting year.
More specifically, the subsample time window contains five years before the targeting event year, the event year (year 0), and five years after the event year. We require a target firm to have at least one loan initiation according to Dealscan in both the pre-event period and the post-event
period. There are a total of 446 target firms in this subsample, spanning about 2,500 loan observations. Table 3 summarizes the intertemporal comparison results. Clearly, in the post-event period, the average loan spread is significantly higher than that in the pre-event period, by about 15 basis points. New loans initiated after the hedge fund intervention are also more likely to be secured and contain a greater number of general covenants. In particular, new loans are more likely to include the asset sales sweep covenant. There are fewer lenders in the average new loan in the post-event period, too. These results are consistent with the baseline results and a worsened credit condition in target firms. However, the loan amount is larger, the maturity is longer, and the number of financial covenants is smaller in the post-event period, which seems at odds with the baseline results.
To resolve the controversy, we also adjust the loan terms by the average levels of the firms' industry. For each target firm, we identify all firms with loan transactions in the same 2-digit SIC industry and the same year and take their average loan terms as the benchmark. The lower panel of Table 3 summarizes the results on the industry-adjusted loan terms. After adjusting for industry effects, the loan amount, the maturity, and the number of financial covenants are no longer different between the pre-and post-event periods. In the meanwhile, the results consistent with the baseline results are preserved. Adjusted for industry, the loan spread is 35 basis points higher in the post-event period. New loans are 13% more likely to be secured and there are 2 fewer lenders in the average loan contract in the post-event period. Furthermore, the adjusted debt issuance sweep covenant dummy and the adjusted capital expenditure restriction covenant dummy become significantly larger on average in the post-event period, which is further evidence for bank lenders' active responses to curb the credit risk.
Matched sample differences-in-differences approach
Our time-series comparison of the pre-and post-event periods shows significant differences in the terms of the initiated loans. In particular, the industry-adjusted measures utilize industry peer firms as a benchmark to control for industry-wide common trends in credit risk.
However, it remains possible that firm characteristics related to credit risk have changed, which is not captured by the industry controls. Therefore, we also consider a panel regression that focuses on the target firm subsample, joint with non-target firms matched on both 2-digit SIC industries and the loan spreads in the pre-event period. Matching on loan spreads reduces the heterogeneity in the ex ante credit risk so that the regression mainly captures the post-event differences. Two matching methods are used. The first method matches each target firm with a firm in the same 2-digit SIC industry that has an average loan spread during the pre-event period closest to that of the target firm. The second method relaxes the loan spread criterion by identifying all same 2-digit SIC industry firms with pre-event average loan spread within 90% to 110% of that of the target firm.
The regression model includes all control variables used in the baseline level regressions.
We use a post-event dummy variable to capture the difference between the pre-and post-event periods and a target dummy variable to identify hedge fund targeting firms. We also include the interaction term of the two variables. Since the model includes year fixed effects that partial out general time trends, the interaction term captures the effect of hedge fund activism on loan terms, if any. To keep the table concise, we only report the results on loan spreads, while the results on most other loan terms are largely consistent with those in the baseline regressions.
18 Table 4 Controlling for these firm and loan characteristics, the coefficient on the post-event dummy is significantly negative and the coefficient on the target dummy is significantly positive, suggesting that, first, there is a contemporaneous decline in loan spreads for the non-target firms around the hedge fund targeting announcement; second, target firms have a higher cost of debt in general. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive, which
shows that the targeting event is associated with a significant increase in the loan spread: the change in spread is higher than that of non-target firms by 6 to 10%, depending on the matching method used.
Cross-sectional heterogeneity in the impact of hedge fund activism on cost of debt
We next explore how the impact of activism on cost of debt varies with the intention of the hedge fund activists, as indicated by their stated objectives. Hedge fund activism can have a variety of different objectives. We focus on the difference between two broad objectives: capital structure versus corporate governance. 8 A capital structure objective is identified if the activism pressures target firms to reduce excess cash, increase financial leverage, or pay higher dividends and make more repurchases. We classify the activism event as having a governance objective if the activism makes efforts to increase board independence, oust the management, or challenge the level and structure of managerial compensation. We also control for the hedge fund tactics with a hostile activism dummy to identify activism that employs hostile tactics such as a threatened or actual proxy contest, takeover, or lawsuit.
The expropriation hypothesis states that hedge fund activism exacerbates the shareholdercreditor incentive conflict and thus increases credit risk. Under this hypothesis, activism targeting capital structure should be associated with a positive effect on the loan spread faced by the target firms, because the capital structure targeting activities tend to increase financial leverage and the overall credit risk. On the other hand, the monitoring hypothesis states that hedge fund activism improves the overall governance of the target firm, resulting in generally increased the overall firm value and also debtholder value. Under this hypothesis, activism targeting governance should be associated with a negative effect on the loan spread.
The cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis is performed in the target firm subsample as used in Table 3 . We include the post-event dummy to capture the effect of activism. We also include the interactions between the post-event dummy and the activism objective dummies, capital structure, governance, and hostility, to capture the heterogeneous effects of different target events on loan spreads. The activism objective dummies are also included for model completeness. As the dependent variable, we consider both the raw log loan spread and the industry-adjusted log loan spread. As before, we use both the OLS and the median regression models.
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The results are summarized in Table 5 . The capital structure dummy is negatively associated with the loan spread, suggesting that firms targeted for capital structure reforms have lower credit risk than the average targeted firm. The coefficients on the firm and loan controls are consistent with previous tests.
The results on the interaction terms are consistent with our hypotheses. The post-event and capital structure interaction has a significantly positive coefficient. The coefficient ranging from 0.179 to 0.452 suggests that activism targeting capital structure increases the loan spread by 17.9% to 45.2%. This result is consistent with the expropriation hypothesis that shareholderdebtholder conflicts exacerbate after the activism event. The post-event and governance interaction has a negative coefficient in the median regressions. The coefficient suggests that activism targeting governance reduces the raw loan spread by 6% and the industry-adjusted loan spread by 18.2%. This result is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis that overall improvement in governance benefits debtholders. In summary, these results provide additional support for the two possible channels ("expropriation" and "monitoring") through which hedge fund activism affects cost of debt.
Robustness
Controlling for endogeneity
We conduct three robustness tests in this section. The first two tests further address the issue that hedge fund targeting is an endogenous decision, and the third test uses debt ratings as an alternative measure of the cost of debt.
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In our first robustness test, we consider a simultaneous regression approach. In the first stage, we employ a probit model that predicts the probability of being targeted for a firm. (2008), we find all explanatory variables to be significantly correlated with the probability of being targeted. Identification requires that the targeting likelihood model include at least one variable not included in the loan term model. We use the number of hedge fund activism events against firms in the same two-digit SIC industry in the previous year as an instrumental variable. This variable is intended to capture the industry-level intensity of activism activities, and should be related to the probability of a firm becoming a target. Moreover, there is no obvious a priori reason to believe that this variable should affect the loan contracting terms.
From this first stage, we obtain the estimated probability of being targeted.
9
The second stage regression then examines whether the estimated probability of being targeted is significantly related to the terms of loan contracts. The results are summarized in Table 6 . For conciseness, we only report the coefficients on the estimated targeting variable. The coefficients and their significance levels for the control variables are similar to those in the baseline specification and are available upon request.
9 All the control variables in the loan term regressions are also included in the first stage estimation of targeting likelihood.
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The simultaneous regression results are highly consistent with our baseline regression results. Firms with a high probability of being targeted are significantly more likely to get loan contracts with high loan spreads and secured loans. Their loans are also significantly more likely to include restrictions on asset sales, debt issuance, dividends, and capital expenditures, and include a greater number of general covenants. Finally, there are fewer lenders willing to participate in their loan syndicates. All in all, the results again show active responses of bank lenders to counteract the adverse effects of hedge fund targeting on credit risk.
Change analysis
Our second robustness test is based on a change regression specification. We take the yearly changes of all dependent and independent variables in the baseline regression specification to include in this change specification. When a dummy variable is considered, its corresponding change variable takes the value of 1 if the change is from 0 to 1, and 0 otherwise.
Since a firm does not always obtain new loan contracts every year, first differencing inevitably limits the sample and results in fewer than 2,000 loan observations. Nonetheless, we believe the change specification provides a viable robustness test.
The results are presented in Table 7 . Similar to Table 6 and for reporting conciseness, only the coefficients on the target dummy variables are reported, although results on other coefficients are available upon request. Again, most results from the baseline specifications hold.
Credit rating as alternative proxy for cost of debt
As our third robustness test, we consider debt ratings as an alternative measure of credit risk. Anecdotal evidence indicates that credit rating agencies might downgrade activism target 23 firms' debt ratings due to the concern with the increased credit risk resulted from activism. For instance, Kerr-McGee Corporation received a downgrade warning from Moody's when Carl
Icanhn asked the firm to sell its assets. 10 In addition, previous studies often use both yield spreads and credit ratings to proxy for cost of debt (e.g., Minton and Schrand, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2002) . Therefore, we examine the effects of hedge fund activism on credit ratings of firms targeted by hedge funds in this subsection.
Our empirical analysis consists of regressions in both a level specification and a change specification. The OLS level regression compares the credit ratings between the hedge fund targeted firms and all other COMPUSTAT listed firms. In this regression, the dependent variable is the S&P debt rating, converted to numeric values ranging from 1 (the lowest rating, D) to 22
(the highest rating, AAA). The main explanatory variables are the target dummy and the lagged target dummy, as used in the baseline regression model. To control for factors related to the credit rating, we include leverage variables, log assets, ROA, and a dummy for loss in recent years. To control for industry-specific effects, we also include capital intensity and dummy variables for the financial industry and the utility industry. These controls follow Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2006).
The change regression examines whether credit ratings are likely to be downgraded for firms that were recently targeted by hedge fund activists. For the dependent variable, we construct a dummy variable to indicate that, in a given year, the debt rating decreases. variable is dichotomous, the probit model is used for the regression. The control variables are yearly changes of the controls in the level specification excluding the industry dummies, which drop out in the change specification due to first differences. The same target dummy and the lagged target dummy are used to identify the effect of activism.
The results are summarized in Table 8 . Consistent with the "expropriation effect", we find that targeted firms are more likely to experience deterioration in their credit ratings relative to non-target firms. In the level regression, both the target dummy and the lagged target dummy have significant negative coefficients, suggesting that target firms' credit ratings are significantly lower after the event. In the change probit regression, the target dummy is significantly positive, indicating a greater likelihood of credit rating downgrade in the event year. Economically, for an average firm with 15% unconditional probability of being downgraded, it is about 8% more likely to be downgraded once it is targeted by hedge fund activism, a substantial increase of likelihood.
The coefficients on the control variables are in line with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006).
Financial leverage is negatively related to the credit rating. Profitability and firm size are positively related to the credit rating. Finally, firms with high capital intensity and those in the financial or utility industries have higher credit ratings than the average firm. In unreported tests, we also perform simultaneous regressions to control for possible endogeneity of targeting and our results are robust to these specifications. 
Conclusion
Using data from Dealscan on bank loans, we find that hedge fund activism significantly increases the credit risk of target firms. While the increase in the loan spread is only 15 basis points when target firms alone are examined, it rises to 35 basis points when target firms are contrasted with their industry peers, a 15% increase from their average credit spread before the activism event. Consistent with the expropriation hypothesis, we find that this effect is primarily concentrated in the activism events explicitly targeting capital structure. There is also some evidence that the activism targeting governance has a negative effect on the loan spread, which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis.
Our results are important for understanding the wealth effect of hedge fund activism on debtholders. The current literature mostly focuses on the effect of hedge fund activism on shareholders' value. The impact on other classes of stakeholders, however, is rarely studied. Two empirical papers on this topic find opposite results of each other (Klein and Zur, 2009; Aslan and Maraachlian, 2009 ). We provide new evidence by studying the debts held by bank lenders, who are more informed and sophisticated than bondholders in the public market. Our results show that, on average, hedge fund activism exacerbates shareholder-debtholder conflicts. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this is particularly true if the activism targets capital structure by requesting increased debt financing and dividend payouts.
These results are also related to the debate whether shareholder governance increases or decreases debtholder value. In particular, Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) and Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009) find that few anti-takeover provisions are associated with high cost of debt and conclude that leverage-increasing takeovers raises the default risk. However, the 26 conclusion can be criticized because few anti-takeover provisions can a result of low risk of takeovers ex ante. While our results are consistent with theirs in that shareholder activism increases the credit risk, our tests are not subject to the same criticism, because hedge fund targeting is an event in which shareholders gain power and our differences-in-differences identification strategy controls for ex ante differences in targeted firms.
Appendix: Variable Definition Loan Contracting Terms:
Loan spread
All-in spread drawn in the Dealscan database. 
Control Variables:
Asset maturity
The book value-weighted maturity of long-term assets and current assets, where the maturity of long-term assets is computed as gross property, plant, and equipment divided by depreciation expense, and the maturity of current assets is computed as current assets divided by the cost of goods sold (Graham et al., 2008) ;
Capital expenditure Capital expenditure in the current year;
Capital intensity Gross PPE divided by total assets;
Cashflow volatility Standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over the four fiscal years prior to the loan initiation year scaled by the total debt;
Credit rating S&P debt rating (COMPUSTAT variable: SPLTICRM). The rating is converted to numeric value based on the following schedule: 22 for AAA, 21 for AA+, 20 for AA, …, and 1 for D;
Credit spread
The difference between AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate bond yield (data source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors);
Dividend yield
The ratio of common dividend to the market value of common stocks;
Financial industry dummy One if the firm is a financial institution (one-digit SIC code 6), zero otherwise;
Institutional ownership
The proportion of shares held by institutions;
Interest coverage Operating income before depreciation divided by interest expense; Leverage Book value of debt/(book value of debt + book value of equity), where debt is the sum of current and long-term debts;
Log asset Log of total asset;
Log market value Log of market capitalization in millions of dollars;
Long-term debt ratio Long-term debt/(book value of debt + book value of equity), where book value of debt is the sum of current and long-term debts;
Loss in recent two years One if the net income before extraordinary items is negative in the current and prior fiscal year, zero otherwise;
Market to book Market value of equity/ book value of equity;
Number of analysts The number of analysts covering the company from I/B/E/S; R&D R&D scaled by lagged assets; ROA EBITDA/lagged assets;
Sales growth
The growth rate of sales over the previous year;
Subordinated debt dummy One if the firm has subordinated debt, zero otherwise; Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment/total assets;
Term spread
The difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield (data source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors);
Tobin's q (Book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value of debt + book value of equity);
Total payout yield The ratio of the sum of dividend and share repurchase to the market value of common stocks;
Figure 1: The effect of hedge fund activism on leverage, dividend payout, and profitability
This figure reports levels and control-group-adjusted levels of leverage (LEV), long-term debt ratio (LTDebtratio), dividend yield (DIVYLD), total payout yield (TPAYYLD), and profitability (ROA) for firms targeted by hedge fund activism, in the 11 years around the targeting event. The matched firms for each target company are assigned from the same year, same industry, based on three-digit SIC, and same 10 10 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios. If the narrow criteria yield no match, we relax the industry group to twodigit SIC, and the size/book-to-market to 5 5 sorted portfolios. The sample period is 1994 to 2008. For each variable under comparison (XX), we denote the mean level of the control groups are denoted as ctrl_XX, and the control-group-adjusted level as adj_XX. This table reports descriptive statistics on loan contracting terms for hedge fund activism target firms before and after the activism event. We collect contracting terms of loans initiated during the [-5, +5 ] window with year 0 defined as the fiscal year in which the hedge fund activism was launched. The sample consists of 446 target firms that have loans initiated in both pre-event and post-event periods. Industry adjusted loan terms are adjusted by the average loan terms of the firms in the same SIC2 industry in the same year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix.
Before hedge fund activism
(1)
After hedge fund activism (2) Differences (2) This table presents the regression results on the impact of hedge fund activism on cost of bank debt (as measured by log loan spread) under the matched sample differences-in-differences approach. We use two matching methods to identify the control firms. Under the first method, for each target firm, we identify the non-target firm that is in the same SIC2 industry with most closely matched average loan spread during [-5, -1] . Under the second method, we use the control firms that are in the same SIC2 industry and have average loan spread within 90%-110% of the average spread of the target firm during [-5, -1] . In addition, the sample only contains firms that have loans initiated in both preevent and post-event windows. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for firmlevel clustering. Fixed effects for industry, year, loan type and loan purpose are included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix. This table examines the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the impact of hedge fund activism on cost of bank debt (as measured by log loan spread). We collect contracting terms of loans initiated during the [-5, +5 ] window with year 0 defined as the fiscal year in which the hedge fund activism was launched. The sample consists of 446 target firms that have loans initiated in both pre-event and post-event periods. Industry adjusted loan spreads are adjusted by the average loan spreads of the firms in the same SIC2 industry in the same year. Capital structure dummy is 1 if the activism targets the firm's capital structure. Governance dummy is 1 if the activism targets the firm's corporate governance. Hostile dummy is 1 if the activism employs hostile tactics (including a threatened or actual proxy contest, takeover, or lawsuit). t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. Fixed effects for industry, year, loan type and loan purpose are included. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix. This table presents the simultaneous regression results on the impact of hedge fund activism on loan contracting terms. Estimated probability of being targeted is computed from the probit regression in which the target dummy is regressed on lagged firm characteristics (log market value, Tobin's q, sales growth, ROA, leverage, dividend yield, R&D, number of analysts, institutional ownership, year and industry dummies). t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. Fixed effects for industry, year, loan type and loan purpose are included. All the control variables in Table 2 loan term models are also included in the regressions, but their coefficients are suppressed for conciseness. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix. This table presents the results on the impact of hedge fund activism on changes in loan contracting terms. The sample contains all Compustat firm-years with loan transactions in both current and previous years (per DealScan) from 1994 to 2008. The loan terms are weighted average loan terms of all loan transactions (using loan amount as weights) for a given firm in a given year. The loan amount is the total loan amounts of all transactions in the year. tstatistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. Year fixed effects are included. Yearly changes of all the control variables in Table 2 loan term models are also included in the regressions, but their coefficients are suppressed for conciseness. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix. 
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